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This paper presents long-term trade scenarios for the world economy up to 2060 based on a modelling approach 
that combines aggregate growth projections for the world with a detailed computable general equilibrium 
sectoral trade model. The analysis suggests that over the next 50 years, the geographical centre of trade will 
continue to shift from OECD to non-OECD regions reflecting faster growth in non-OECD countries. The relative 
importance of different regions in specific export markets is set to change markedly over the next half century 
with emerging economies gaining export shares in manufacturing and services. Trade liberalisation, including 
gradual removal of tariffs, regulatory barriers in services and agricultural support, as well as a reduction in 
transaction costs on goods, could increase global trade and GDP over the next 50 years. Specific scenarios of 
regional liberalisation among a core group of OECD countries or partial multilateral liberalisation could, 
respectively, raise trade by 4% and 15% and GDP by 0.6% and 2.8% by 2060 relative to the status quo. Finally, 
the model highlights that investment in education has an influence on trade and high-skill specialisation 
patterns over the coming decades. Slower educational upgrading in key emerging economies than expected in 
the baseline scenario could reduce world exports by 2% by 2060. Lower up-skilling in emerging economies 
would also slow down the restructuring towards higher value-added activities in these emerging economies.
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1. Introduction
Global trade is undergoing rapid change through a fragmentation of production 
processes and the integration of emerging economies into the global market. These trends 
are affecting trade and industrial specialisation around the globe. To explore likely changes 
in global trade and specialisation patterns at the 2060 horizon, this paper combines the 
modelling of the aggregate growth trajectories of individual countries with a detailed 
modelling of global trade relationships and trade barriers at the sectoral level. Growth 
trajectories for the 34 current OECD economies and eight non-OECD G20 emerging 
countries rely on projections from the OECD long-term scenario model (Johansson et al., 2013) 
and are consistent with the long-term OECD Economic Outlook baseline (OECD, 2013). The 
OECD projections are used as an input in CEPII’s MaGE model which provides growth 
projections for another 105 countries (Fouré et al., 2012, 2013). The reason for mixing two 
sets of projections is that this work is part of a broader OECD research agenda on long-term 
challenges in which a common set of growth projections for OECD countries are used to 
assess various long-term issues, not only trade ones (for details see OECD, 2014).1
CEPII’s and OECD’s long-term growth models rely on conditional convergence, in 
which each country is expected to converge to its own steady-state in the long run. The 
projections account for the main structural factors affecting potential growth in the future: 
socio-demographic dynamics, human and physical capital accumulation and productivity 
developments.2 The CEPII and OECD models differ in some aspects. The OECD model 
highlights the link between structural policies and growth determinants, while the CEPII 
model emphasises energy use and efficiency as well female labour force participation. The 
OECD and CEPII growth projections are made consistent to obtain a baseline growth 
trajectory for 147 countries in real terms.
The paper then analyses how world trade and specialisation patterns will evolve along 
this baseline growth trajectory. To this end, country-specific baseline growth trajectories are 
used to design a dynamic baseline for a multisectoral CGE model of the world economy, 
MIRAGE-e (Fontagné et al., 2013). In addition to calibrating the CGE model to reproduce the 
baseline trajectories for GDP, saving and current account imbalances, the CGE dynamic 
baseline includes a detailed modelling of the sector-specific trajectory of productivity (in 
agriculture, manufacturing and services). Energy demands in the baseline are calibrated on 
the IEA scenario of future fossil energy prices. This way, MIRAGE-e provides a baseline 
projection for the allocation of production across sectors, for bilateral and sectoral trade 
flows, as well as for factor incomes. Whereas the baseline growth trajectories are country-
specific (though with a constraint on the global investment-saving balance), the CGE 
baseline projections are defined at the regional level. The countries included in MIRAGE-e 
are aggregated into 26 regions or country groupings based on a detailed description of the 
economy of each region, with two categories of labour (skilled and unskilled) and 25 sectors.
Once this baseline growth trajectory and dynamic CGE baseline projection for the world 
economy has been constructed, the paper analyses an alternative baseline assuming slower 
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accumulation of human capital in three Asian emerging economies, to explore repercussions 
on growth, specialisation, trade and relative wages of skilled and unskilled labour and two 
stylised trade liberalisation scenarios. Two trade scenarios, a partial multilateral 
liberalisation and a full regional liberalisation, are compared with the baseline to explore in 
each case the impact on trade patterns and income distribution across skill levels.
The partial multilateral scenario assumes that world economies pursue a level-playing 
field for trade in goods and services, further cutting tariffs on goods on a multilateral basis, 
decoupling agricultural subsidies in all OECD countries, reducing non-tariff frictions to 
trade in goods, and letting regulatory obstacles to trade in services partially converge to 
those remaining in the EU in 2004. No assumption is made regarding the success or failure 
of the current Round of multilateral negotiations. Evolutions in tariffs, non-tariff barriers 
and frictions are considered to be the outcome of negotiation within the multilateral 
framework.
The full regional liberalisation scenario assumes developed economies firstly embark 
on an ambitious regional agreement (implemented progressively) fully phasing out tariffs, 
reducing regulatory obstacles to trade in services and frictions to trade in goods as above, 
but without decoupling of agricultural subsidies. This first phase of regionalism starting in 
2014, would be extended to several other non-OECD countries from 2030 on, whereby 
major developing economies would embark in this liberalisation as well, though with less 
ambition regarding tariffs. In such a regional scenario, only 38 economies of the world 
(European Union, Canada, the United States, Mexico, EFTA members, Australia, New Zealand
and Japan) are engaged in the full facilitation of trade in goods and services.
The remainder of this paper first describes our modelling approach and methodology 
in Section 2, while Section 3 describes in detail the assumptions underlying the baseline, 
the alternative baseline with slower skill accumulation in emerging economies and the two 
trade policy scenarios. Section 4 presents the results from the modelling exercise and 
Section 5 concludes.
2. Methodology
OECD long-term macroeconomic projections for 42 countries are combined with CEPII 
long-term projections for the remaining 105 developing economies. These projections provide 
a consistent set of country-specific variables to be introduced in a CGE: GDP, saving rates, 
skilled and unskilled labour supply, current account balances and energy efficiency. In 
addition, a common set of exogenous variables is used regarding demography, human capital 
and energy prices. These macro projections are used to draw scenarios for trade patterns at 
the 2060 horizon for the world economy split into 26 regions/countries and 25 sectors.
2.1. Combining models for the world economy
2.1.1. The OECD long-term model
The growth model developed by the OECD, documented in Johansson et al. (2013), is 
used to project growth to 2060 for the 34 OECD members and eight non-OECD G20 
members. It derives potential output from a Cobb-Douglas production function featuring 
physical capital, human capital and labour. The two latter production factors are subject to 
a common technical progress.
While population projections are exogenous (from Eurostat and United Nations 
Population databases), labour force participation rates are projected using a cohort approach.
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In practice the cohort approach assumes that the observed participation behaviour of 
individuals belonging to the most recent cohorts will continue in the future and this 
amounts to juxtapose constant age- and gender-specific entry and exit rates (varying with 
educational attainment). Special treatment is provided for retirement age, which embodies 
current and planned pension reforms and is indexed to changes in life expectancy over the 
long run, so as to maintain a constant share of active lives. Unemployment is assumed to 
converge towards the long-term level of unemployment (which is chosen to be the lowest 
level of Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment, NAIRU, between 2007 and 2013), 
at country-specific speeds that depend on labour market policies. Human capital is 
measured by average years of schooling of the adult population. Educational attainment of 
cohorts aged 25-29 is assumed to slowly converge to current best practice (Korea) over the 
long run at the average speed observed globally over the period 1960-2005, with attainment 
in Korea also gradually improving. Future educational attainment of the adult population 
is then projected using a perpetual inventory model and this projected stock of average 
years of schooling is converted into a measure of human capital assuming decreasing 
returns to education.
Total factor productivity (TFP) dynamics are governed by an estimated error-correction 
model featuring conditional convergence. TFP projections are driven by the global rate of 
technological progress and the speed of “catch-up” towards the country-specific steady-
state level of TFP. Specifically, the country-specific long-run TFP level depends on the 
common global pace of technological progress and the country’s regulations in product 
markets. The speed of convergence towards this long-run TFP level is country-specific as it 
depends on the degree of openness to trade. Greater openness to trade increases the speed 
of convergence towards the technological frontier, thus enhancing TFP growth.
Since in most developed economies, the ratio of capital to trend output has been 
relatively stable, the underlying projection for capital assumes a continuation of this stability 
in capital intensity.3 The projections of the underlying capital-output ratio are then subject 
to influences from the real cost of capital, which varies mainly due to changes in real interest 
rates. Saving rates are estimated as a function of old-age and youth dependency ratios, life 
expectancy, fiscal balances, terms of trade, productivity growth, net oil balances and the 
availability of credit. Projected investment and saving patterns determine residually current 
account balances for the 42 countries covered.
A closure rule imposes a constant overall saving-investment imbalance for the 
42 countries. Deviations from such a rule are reflected in changes of world interest rates 
that change the country-specific equilibrium capital stocks via the cost of capital. Other 
equilibrating mechanisms include risk premia on excessive public and external 
indebtedness, which also affect the country-specific costs of capital.
Policy-wise, the OECD baseline trajectory assumptions include:
● gradual convergence over the long run in product market regulations and institutions 
towards settings currently found in the average OECD country;
● stabilisation of debt levels at 60 % of GDP in countries with initial debt in excess of 60% 
while in countries with debt below 60%, debt is stabilised at the current level;
● gradual increase over the long run in financial market development to the current level 
in the United States, and;
● gradual increase over the long run in social spending in emerging economies to provisions
similar to the average OECD country.
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2.1.2. MaGE: CEPII’s long-term model
Projections for 105 additional developing countries are obtained with the MaGE model 
proposed in Fouré et al. (2012, 2013). Based on a three-factor (capital, labour, energy) and 
two-technical progress (capital-labour and energy-specific) production function, MaGE is a 
supply-side oriented macroeconomic growth model, defined at country level for 147 countries 
(although only 105 are covered in this projection exercise as the other are covered by the OECD 
projections). It was built in three steps: production factor and productivity data were collected 
for the 1980-2009 period drawing on World Bank, United Nations and International Labour 
Organization data; behavioural relations for factor accumulation and productivity growth 
were estimated; and these relations were used to project GDP.
Supply is modelled as a CES production function of energy and a Cobb-Douglas bundle 
of capital and labour. In MaGE, technological progress includes energy efficiency and TFP. It 
is derived theoretically, and estimated econometrically at the macroeconomic level.
Behavioural relations are estimated for the education level, female participation to the 
labour force, capital accumulation and the two forms of efficiency improvements. The 
labour force projection starts from UN population projections, split across 5-year age 
groups. For each of these age groups, education is estimated and labour force participation 
is derived in the following way. While male labour force participation follows the logistic 
relation determined by the International Labour Organization projections (and therefore 
does not depend on education), female participation is assumed to change with education 
level (more education means less participation for the study-age women, while it enhances 
participation afterwards). Educational attainment, defined as the percentage of each age 
group having attained a secondary or tertiary diploma, is assumed to follow a catch-up 
process to the leaders. The catching-up has different speeds, depending on the region and 
age-group, while the leader levels for each age-group and educational level are composites 
of the different leader countries (i.e. Austria, Japan, the United States, Switzerland, France, 
Norway, New Zealand and Russia, depending on the education level and time period). In 
turn, these best-practice targets are assumed to continue to grow at their historical pace.
Investment in MaGE is a function of savings. It is modelled as a non-unitary error-
correction relationship that differentiates long-term correlation between saving and 
investment and annual adjustments around this trend. Saving is a function of economic 
growth and the age structure of the population, consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis. 
Capital accumulates in MaGE according to a permanent-inventory process with a constant 
depreciation rate. The closure rule in MaGE imposes consistency between saving and 
investment at the global level.
Capital-labour TFP and energy efficiency are driven by catch-up to the best-performing 
countries. TFP catch-up is conditional on, and driven by, the educational level, while 
tertiary education fuels innovation (autonomous productivity improvements), secondary 
education is a prerequisite for imitation (catching-up). Energy efficiency catch up depends 
both on the distance to the technological frontier in energy use, and on the level of 
development, to reflect differences in sectoral structure across countries.4
2.1.3. Consistency between OECD and CEPII models
The OECD and MaGE modelling frameworks share certain essential characteristics 
(production function approach, conditional convergence, life-cycle savings, closure rule, etc.)
but also differ in many respects. This partly reflects the different coverage of countries – with
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OECD projecting growth for advanced and major emerging economies and MaGE projecting 
growth for a larger set of countries for which data may be scarce – and different focus – 
with OECD projections highlighting the role of policies and looking also at fiscal balances 
and MaGE projections giving a more detailed account of catching up processes in terms of 
education, female participation, energy efficiency and addressing the role of oil rents in 
determining GDP changes of major oil exporters. Projections with MaGE are also less 
demanding in terms of data, which facilitates the extension of the exercise to a larger set 
of countries. In sum, the OECD and MaGE are broadly similar but each is best suited to deal 
with advanced and developing economies, respectively. In view of differences in 
specification, particular care has been taken to exploit the complementarity and ensure 
consistency of the two sets of projections.
In practice, projections of GDP, labour force, education and current accounts for the 
42 countries covered by the OECD long-term model are used as an input for MaGE. Some 
variables that are not available in OECD projections or not suited for MaGE specification are 
derived according to MaGE’s estimated relationships. TFP for the 42 OECD and non-OECD 
G20 countries is recovered as the gap between the projected production factors (capital, 
labour and energy) and the GDP projected by the OECD model, but encompassing the effect 
of human capital accumulation in the technical progress.5 For the remaining 105 countries, 
productivity levels, production factors and GDP are recovered using MaGE assumptions. 
Investment in the 105 countries adjusts to match the saving-investment balance at the 
global level. This ensures consistency between the closure rules of the two models, as the 
overall imbalance for the 42 countries covered by the OECD model is compensated by a 
symmetric overall imbalance for MaGE’s 105 countries, with the global surplus or deficit of 
investment distributed to these latter countries proportionally to their contribution to 
global pre-rescaling investment levels.
2.2. From the macro to the sectoral level
The multi-sectoral CGE model has a recursive sequential dynamic set-up that is fed with 
the output of the OECD and MaGE aggregate growth models. Projections from these models 
are used to construct a dynamic baseline for MIRAGE-e (Fontagné et al., 2013; Decreux and 
Valin, 2007). MIRAGE-e relies on the same exogenous variables (population, energy prices) that 
are embodied in the macroeconomic models, but takes as additional exogenous variables the 
results from the macroeconomic projections, notably GDP, saving rates, current accounts, 
labour force, human capital formation and energy efficiency. Moreover, the distribution of 
human capital in the population is used to set the number of skilled and unskilled workers in 
MIRAGE-e, which distinguishes these two categories of labour, with the assumption that 
skilled workers correspond to people having obtained a tertiary level diploma. The global 
closure of MIRAGE-e is ensured by imposing that the share of each country/region in the 
global current account imbalance varies yearly according to the macro projections.
2.2.1. Supply in MIRAGE-e
On the supply side, each sector in MIRAGE-e is modelled as a representative firm, 
which combines value-added and intermediate consumption in fixed shares. Value-added 
is a bundle of imperfectly substitutable primary factors (capital, skilled and unskilled 
labour, land and natural resources) and energy. Firms’ demand for production factors is 
organised as a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) aggregation of land, natural 
resources, unskilled labour, and a bundle of the remaining factors. This bundle is a nested 
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CES aggregate of skilled labour, and another bundle of capital and energy. Finally, energy is 
a CES aggregate of energy sources (except for non-electricity energy production sectors, for 
which the share of each energy input is fixed). Energy consumption of the representative 
firm comprises five energy goods (electricity, coal, oil, gas and refined petroleum), which 
are aggregated in a single bundle that mainly substitutes for capital.
MIRAGE-e assumes full employment of primary factors, whose growth rates are set 
exogenously based on the macro projections on a yearly step, as detailed below.6
● Population, participation in the labour market and human capital evolve in each country 
(or region of the world economy) according to the demographics embedded in the macro 
projections. This determines the labour force as well as its skill composition (skilled/
unskilled).7 Skilled and unskilled labour is perfectly mobile across sectors, but immobile 
between countries.
● Natural resources are sector specific, while land is mobile not only between agricultural 
sectors but also between agriculture and other uses. Natural resources for the mining 
sector and land for agricultural sectors are set at their 2004 levels: prices adjust demand 
to this fixed supply. In the baseline, natural resources for fossil fuel production sectors 
adjust to match the imposed exogenous price target (taken from the International 
Energy Agency, 2012) for coal, oil and gas, and according to the energy demand projected 
by the model. By contrast, in the simulations, changes in demand for fossil energy 
sources influence their price, while natural resources are fixed at their baseline level. In 
practice environmental damages could hamper long-run growth. A recent OECD study 
undertook CGE-modelling-based assessment of environmental damages, using similar 
long-run projections for OECD countries as those used in this paper (OECD, 2015). This 
research showed that only agricultural and energy world trade patterns would be 
significantly altered by taking climate change into account. Therefore, as a first 
approximation, most of the results presented in this study would not be significantly 
affected by environmental feedback effects on growth.
● Installed capital is assumed to be immobile (sector-specific), while investments are 
allocated across sectors according to their rates of return. The overall stock of capital 
evolves by combining capital formation and a constant depreciation rate of capital of 6% 
that is the same as in the long-term growth models. Gross investment is determined by 
the combination of saving (the saving rate from the growth model, applied to the 
national income) and the current account. Finally, while total investment is saving-
driven, its allocation is determined by the rate of return on investment in the various 
activities. For simplicity, and because of lack of reliable data on foreign direct investment 
at country of origin, host and sectoral levels, international capital flows only appear 
through the current account imbalances, and are not explicitly modelled.
2.2.2. Demand in MIRAGE-e
On the demand side, a representative consumer from each country/region maximises 
instantaneous utility under a budget constraint and saves a part of its income. Expenditure is 
allocated to commodities and services according to a LES-CES (Linear Expenditure System – 
Constant Elasticity of Substitution) function. This implies that, above a minimum consumption 
of goods produced by each sector, consumption choices among goods produced by different 
sectors are made according to a CES. This representation of preferences is well suited to the 
analysis as it is flexible enough to deal with countries at different levels of development.
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Within each sector, goods are differentiated by their origin. A nested CES function 
allows for a particular status for domestic products according to the usual Armington 
hypothesis (Armington, 1969): consumers’ and firms’ choices are biased towards domestic 
production, and therefore domestic and foreign goods are imperfectly substitutable, using 
a CES specification. Armington elasticities (defined at sector level but common to all 
regions) are recovered from the GTAP database (Global Trade Analysis Project) and 
estimated by Hertel et al. (2007). Total demand is built from final consumption, intermediate
consumption and investment in capital goods.
Efficiency in the use of primary factors and intermediate inputs is based on the 
combination of four mechanisms. First, agricultural productivity is projected separately, as 
detailed in Fontagné et al. (2013). Second, energy efficiency computed from the aggregate 
growth models is imposed on MIRAGE-e (it enters the capital-energy bundle). Third, a 
2 percentage point growth difference between TFP in manufactures and services is assumed 
(as in van den Mensbrugghe, 2005). Fourth, given the agricultural productivity and the 
relation between productivity in manufacturing and services, MIRAGE-e recovers 
endogenously country-specific TFP from the exogenous GDP and production factors. Notice 
that TFP thus recovered from the baseline projections is subsequently set as exogenous in 
the alternative scenarios. Therefore, GDP becomes endogenous in such scenarios.
Dynamics in MIRAGE-e are implemented in a sequentially recursive way. That is, the 
equilibrium can be solved successively for each period, given the exogenous variations of 
GDP, savings, current accounts, active population and skill level coming from the growth 
models, as described above. For baseline projections, the time span is 56 years, the starting 
point being 2004. This version of MIRAGE-e assumes that all markets are in equilibrium at 
each period, with an assumption of generalised perfect competition.
MIRAGE-e was calibrated on the GTAP dataset version 7, with 2004 as a base year. As 
shown in Table 1, our data aggregation singles out all energy industries and combines other 
industries into main representative subsectors within the agriculture, manufacturing and 
services aggregates. For the regional aggregation, the main OECD member countries are 
retained, while other member countries are aggregated. Main emerging economies are also 
isolated whereas the rest of the world is aggregated on a geographical basis. Table 1 shows 
the composition of regions, highlighting which of them is fully described in the OECD long-
term aggregate growth projections. For instance, all countries in the euro area, considered as 
a region in MIRAGE, were modelled individually using the OECD macroeconomic framework. 
In contrast, only one country (Israel) in the Middle-East region of MIRAGE was modelled by 
the OECD. Finally, North Africa is an example of a region in MIRAGE which has been modelled 
exclusively by MaGE.
Tariff data at the HS6 level corresponds to the ad valorem equivalents from the MAcMap 
HS6 database (Guimbard et al., 2012) and are aggregated to match our regional and sectoral 
decomposition using the reference group methodology (Bouët et al., 2008). Finally, the model 
includes international transaction costs and non-tariff measures (NTM) in services, 
modelled as an iceberg trade cost (i.e. cost of transporting a good that uses up a fraction of the 
good). Data for trade costs associated with delays were calibrated using a database provided 
by Minor and Tsigas (2008), who adopt the methodology in Hummels and Schaur (2012). 
NTM in services are ad valorem equivalents taken from Fontagné et al. (2011).
The way in which the OECD long-term model, MaGE and MIRAGE-e are related is 
summarised in Figure 1, which shows the different variables that the models exchange and 
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the point at which assumptions are introduced (see Section 3 for details). Notice that two 
alternative sets of assumptions on educational catch-up lead to two alternative baseline 
scenarios. Accordingly, two alternative baselines are compared in the education scenario. 
Table 1.  Sector and country aggregation in MIRAGE-e
Regions Sectors
OECD countries
Euro area1
United Kingdom1
European Free Trade Agreement1
Rest of European Union1
Turkey1
United States1
Canada1
Mexico1
Chile1
Japan1
South Korea1
Australia and New Zealand1
Non-OECD countries
Russian Federation1
Rest of Europe
Middle-East2
North Africa
South Africa1
Other African countries
Brazil1
Other Latin America2
China1
India1
Indonesia1
Other ASEAN countries
Other Developing Asia
Caspian
Primary
Crops
Livestock
Other agriculture
Other primary
Energy
Coal
Oil
Gas
Electricity
Refined petroleum
Manufacturing
Food
Textile
Paper and publishing and wood products
Chemicals, rubber and plastics
Iron and steel
Metals
Metal products
Transport equipment
Electronic devices
Other minerals
Other manufacturing
Services
Trade
Transport
Finance, insurance and business services
Public administration
Other services
1. Regions fully included in the 42 OECD sample.
2. Regions with one country only in the 42 OECD sample (Argentina and Israel).
Figure 1.  Description of the models and assumptions
1. See Table 2.
Note: Vertical arrows show scenario assumptions, while horizontal arrows indicate variable flows between the models.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
GDP
Population
Active population
Current account
Education
(42 countries)
GDP
Population
Active population
Current account
Education
Savings
Energy efficiency
(147 countries)
TFP
Energy resources
MaGEOECD MIRAGE
MIRAGE
Baseline
Lower upskilling
Reference
Baseline
Lower upskilling
Lower upskilling reference
Multilateral
Regional
Tariffs
Transaction costs
NTM in services
Agricultural subsidiesEducation Baseline assumptions1
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However, trade liberalisation scenarios (regionalism versus multilateralism) are implemented 
as trade policy shocks in the baseline with high education only. Details on assumptions 
underlying these simulations are described in the next sections.
3. Education baseline alternative and trade liberalisation scenarios
The main objective of this paper is to investigate the driving forces of trade and 
specialisation patterns at the 2060 horizon. In order to do this a coherent baseline scenario 
for the world economy is constructed, based on the evolution of major determinants of 
growth (such as demography, physical and human capital accumulation and energy 
availability). This framework integrates available information on preferential trade 
agreements already signed. After calibrating MIRAGE-e in order to reproduce the long-term 
trade to income elasticities projected in the growth baseline trajectory, we obtain a 
baseline for the CGE that is shocked using the two scenarios already mentioned: full 
regional trade liberalisation versus partial multilateral liberalisation.
3.1. Baseline assumptions
When projecting trade patterns, it is important to rely on a model that is able to 
reproduce some basic stylised facts such as the trade-to-income elasticity. Here we follow 
the methodology described in Fontagné and Fouré (2013) to make the model mimic this 
elasticity. As shown in Table 2, four main drivers of this elasticity are tariffs, fossil-fuel 
energy prices, transaction costs for goods and TFP in the transportation sector. While 
energy prices are drawn from the International Energy Agency projections to 2035 (these 
are extended linearly to 2060 in MIRAGE), the three remaining parameters need to be 
calibrated to reproduce past evolutions of world trade.
Determining a reference scenario for drivers such as transaction costs or TFP in the 
transportation sector is a difficult exercise, as they summarise a large variety of 
determinants. Productivity in transports encompasses breakthroughs like containerisation.
Product standards also influence the transaction costs (approximated here by the tariff-
equivalent of time spent in duties), along with the administrative organisation of duties 
and other related factors.
To proceed, the four drivers are calibrated using trajectories similar to those observed 
over the past 50 years. This implies adding a 2% additional TFP growth in transportation 
(compared with other services), in line with estimations by Wolff (1999) on years 1958-87. 
Finally it is necessary to calibrate a 25% decrease in transaction costs for goods, to recover 
a long-term elasticity in line with the observed one.
Then, since the trade liberalisation scenarios will consider scenarios on agricultural 
subsidies, the implemented reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the 
Table 2.  Baseline scenario assumptions
Variable Baseline assumption
Energy prices (coal/oil/gas) IEA (2012)
Transaction costs for goods -25% in 2035 (-45% in 2060); (Fontagné and Fouré, 2013)
TFP in transports +2% annual growth (compared with services); (Fontagné and Fouré, 2013)
Free Trade Agreements EU28/ASEAN and partners
New Common Agricultural Policy -75% factor subsidy in EU in 2005 (crops and other agriculture)
-50% factor subsidy in EU in 2005 (livestock)
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European Union acted in 2003 and taking into effect in 2005 are incorporated in the model. 
This is done in a simplified form (due to the sectoral aggregation), based on Gouel and 
Laborde (2007).
Finally, the MIRAGE-e baseline includes Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) that are already 
planned at the time of writing, using the WTO database on regional trade agreements.8
This results in two FTAs (enlargement of the European Union to 27 and then 28 members, 
plus implementation of the ASEAN treaties) and six bilateral regional agreements (between 
EU and Korea, and the so-called ASEAN+6 agreements). These agreements are 
implemented at the Harmonized commodity Description and Coding System 6 (HS6) level 
using MAcMap for 2004. The timing for implementation is summarised in Figure 2.
The implementation of these FTAs is two-fold.9 First, it consists in the progressive 
abolition of tariff duties among the participants. For each step of each agreement, the tariff 
reduction is linearly implemented at the HS6 commodity level for all countries, and the 
results are aggregated to our mapping described in Table 1. Second, the external tariff 
(imposed on non-FTA members) of the FTA members is homogenised. Concerning the 
European Union, it is assumed that Croatia adopts pre-existing European tariffs in 2013, 
whereas for the ASEAN it is assumed that all members adopt the average tariff at the end 
of the implementation (2015).
Together these assumptions imply that the model projects an elasticity of world trade to 
world GDP of around 1.4 for goods (as compared with 2.8 during the 1990s and with 
1.6 between 1950 and 2009) and 1.2 for services (Figure 3). This lower elasticity for services is 
coherent with the assumptions, since the baseline projection does not include scenarios on 
NTM in services. This lower responsiveness of trade to GDP as compared with the one during 
the 1990s partly reflects that the intensity of fragmentation of global value chains that 
occurred in the last decades is hypothesised to slow down as there are likely physical limits 
Figure 2.  Baseline free trade agreements1
1. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) consists of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar (Burma) and Vietnam. AUNZ denotes Australia and New Zealand.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
EU28
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ASEAN-Japan
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on how much a product can be fragmented (Fontagné and Fouré, 2013). This is consistent 
with a recent study by Constantinescu et al. (2015) which suggested that the slowdown in 
trade in the 2000s was partly due to a structural change in the trade-GDP relationship.
3.2. Education baseline variant scenario
Given that long-term growth trajectories are likely to be influenced by the skill 
distribution, as emphasised in Fontagné and Fouré (2013), it is worth comparing our central 
baseline with one in which skill developments are different. Since a more educated 
population is likely to influence TFP, the three steps constituting our modelling exercise 
(i.e. the OECD model, the MaGE and the MIRAGE baseline) are recomputed with a different 
configuration of skills (so-called lower up-skilling scenario). In this lower skill scenario, 
human capital upgrading in key emerging economies is weaker than in the baseline 
scenario.
Changes in the stock of human capital influence aggregate growth, especially in 
developing economies, and affect trade patterns across countries. Among the main 
developing countries, the Asian ones have exhibited large improvements in terms of human 
capital accumulation and technological progress (Fouré et al., 2012), while remaining at a 
relatively low level of productivity, leaving room for the large improvements that occur in our 
projections. Therefore, the low-skill scenario focus on the three largest Asian developing 
countries – China, India and Indonesia, hereafter called CII economies – and implement an 
alternative baseline in which the educational attainment of the cohort aged 25-29 will 
converge to the frontier level of education at a speed that is 50% slower than assumed in the 
baseline macro projections. As a result, by 2060 average years of schooling are around 
1.2 years lower in these three countries as compared with the baseline.
3.3. Trade liberalisation scenarios: Regionalism versus multilateralism
Despite reductions in market- and non-market barriers to trade during the last 
decades, particularly for industrial products, significant barriers still remain at the global 
level. These barriers go beyond tariffs on goods. Regulatory obstacles to trade in services, 
Figure 3.  Growth of GDP, exports in goods and services 
and income elasticities, 2012-601
1. Goods and services exports including intra-trade.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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agricultural subsidies and transaction costs on goods remain large. While trade liberalisation 
can take different forms, the approach in this paper is to describe two stylised alternative 
trade facilitation scenarios as summarised in Table 3. In the partial multilateral liberalisation
scenario, applied tariffs on goods are linearly halved and there is a further 25% reduction 
in international transaction costs relative to baseline. Moreover, outside the EU regulatory 
obstacles to trade in services partially converge towards current EU levels, while EU further 
implements its internal market for services (leading to a 10% decrease of barriers to trade 
in services among member states over the long run). Coupled agricultural subsidies are 
phased out in the OECD, beyond Europe.
The full regional liberalisation scenario considers two horizons. The large FTA area 
comprising NAFTA, the European Union, Australia/New Zealand, Japan and Korea is 
completed by 2060. This is a long process, but the zone is very large and diverse. Some of 
its members are potentially attached to agricultural subsidies, which are eventually not 
phased out as opposed to the multilateral scenario. Tariffs are phased out, while progress 
in terms of market access for services and transaction costs is now limited to the borders 
of the FTA. From 2014 to 2030, trade liberalisation is strictly limited to the wide region 
so-defined. Then, from 2030 on, this region reduces tariffs on a bilateral and reciprocal 
basis with a series of preferred partners, including the BRICs, South Africa, ASEAN and 
Chile. Neither trade in services nor transaction costs are concerned.
These scenarios are designed to allow for comparison between a full liberalisation 
between a small number of (developed mostly OECD) countries, along with bilateral 
agreements, and a liberalisation resulting from global multilateral negotiations, while 
keeping assumptions simple to be able to trace their implications. Indeed, a multilateral 
framework is likely to lead to a less ambitious agreement (as demonstrated by the tensions 
on the Doha agenda) both in terms of tariff reduction and non-tariff measures.
4. Results
4.1. Baseline long-run GDP and trade scenario
4.1.1. Global growth will be sustained by emerging economies
Over the next half century, world GDP is projected to grow on average around 3% per 
year with declining rates in many countries. Up until 2030, world growth will be sustained 
by a rising weight of China and India with high, albeit declining, growth while after 2030 
fast growth in Africa is expected to support world growth. The OECD trend GDP growth is 
projected at about 2% annually until 2050-60, and growth in emerging economies will 
Table 3.  Trade policy scenarios
Variable Partial multilateral liberalisation Full regional liberalisation
Tariffs -50% in 2060 (compared with baseline 
scenario)
-100% in 2060 in the FTA area
-50% in 2060 with partners (from 2030)
Transaction costs for goods -25% in 2060 -25% in 2060 in the FTA zone
NTM in services -10% in 2060 among EU members.
Half convergence in 2060 to average  
intra-EU level between other countries.
-10% in 2060 among EU members.
Half convergence in 2060 to average intra-EU 
level for other countries inside FTA area.
Coupled agricultural subsidies -50% in 2060 for EU, US, Japan, Korea, 
Canada, EFTA.
No change
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continue to outpace the OECD, but the difference will narrow over coming decades as 
income levels in emerging economies catch up to those in the OECD (Figure 4). As a result, 
the next 50 years will see major changes in the relative importance of countries or regions 
in global GDP.
Concerning the composition of GDP, two forces are at play. Relative prices change due 
to overall differences in TFP (relative prices of manufactured goods decrease) while, in 
developing countries, preferences shift toward services. By 2060, services will represent a 
lower share of world consumption but a higher share of consumption in developing 
economies (Figure 5).
Figure 4.  Growth in real GDP over the next 50 years1
1. World GDP refers to 147 countries.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Figure 5.  Share of services in consumption, selected countries, 2012 and 2060
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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4.1.2. Continuing globalisation over the next half century
Growth in trade (gross exports of goods and services) is expected to continue to 
outpace GDP growth over the next 50 years with world trade estimated to grow at around 
3.5% annually (compared with 6.9% over the period 1990-2007).
In terms of geographical distribution, there will be large shifts in trade patterns, 
reflecting among other things uneven developments in income across the globe as well as 
changes in comparative advantages (Figure 6). China and India are projected to gain market 
shares in world trade over the next half century, although the rapid growth in China’s trade 
share is expected to slow down after 2030, as GDP growth is slowing. Likewise, Africa, 
Indonesia and other Asian economies are projected to experience sizeable increases in trade 
shares, especially after 2030, reflecting rapid growth leading to larger economic size 
combined with low production costs. These gains in trade shares of emerging and 
developing economies are mostly at the expense of Euro area members. From having 
accounted for 19% of world exports in 2012, the Euro area’s market share in exports is 
expected to fall to approximately 12% by 2060. However, given the increase of world imports 
Figure 6.  The geographical distribution of trade will shift
Gross exports as a share of world exports (volume), %
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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over that period, Euro area exports are expected to triple despite such reduced market share. 
By contrast, some OECD economies, including the United States and Canada, are projected 
to see their trade shares decrease only slightly, reflecting comparatively more favourable 
growth projections than the euro area.
The changing geographical distribution of trade is matched by changes in the relative 
importance of different sets of trading partners (Figure 7). Trade volumes are driven, 
among other things, by gravity factors including size of economies, distance or language. 
Consistent with this, the projections of the CGE model suggest that the expected shift of 
wealth creation from OECD to non-OECD countries will have important implications for 
trade patterns. While in 2012 about half of total trade in bilateral terms took place within 
the OECD area, the importance of bilateral trade among OECD members is expected to 
nearly halve by 2060. Instead, by 2060 trade among non-OECD economies will more than 
double, to account for approximately one-third of global trade. For instance, trade among 
Asian economies increases from around 6% to 16% over the projection period. At the same 
time, OECD economies will increasingly import products from non-OECD economies, 
whereas the share of global imports of non-OECD from OECD countries will remain more 
or less unchanged. All in all, over the next 50 years the geographical centre of trade is 
projected to move away from OECD towards non-OECD countries.
4.1.3. Globalisation and income convergence will influence trade patterns
The relative importance of different countries and regions in specific markets is set to 
change markedly over the coming decades, driven by diverging growth performance, changes 
in relative productivity and production prices as well as a reorientation of consumption in 
emerging economies towards services (Figure 8). Notably, China, India, other Asian 
economies and Africa are projected to become the dominant players in manufacturing, while 
most OECD countries are expected to lose ground. For instance, Japan, Korea and the 
United States are set to lose their comparative advantage in electronics to China and other 
Asian countries (see Appendix A, Figure A.1), who could account for as much as 70% of world 
exports in electronics by 2060. However, the long-run trends for detailed sectors should be 
interpreted with caution, given that the model-based scenario cannot foresee and 
incorporate major shifts in consumer preferences or technological breakthroughs.
Figure 7.  A growing share of bilateral trade will occur 
between different non-OECD countries
Share of global gross exports (volume), %
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Emerging and developing economies’ (e.g. China, India and Africa) world market 
shares will increase significantly even in service trade, as a result of a shift towards more 
advanced activities as these economies become wealthier, combined with a larger 
economic size. The gain in service trade shares in China and India is mostly at the expense 
of the Euro area, the United States, Japan and the United Kingdom. This tendency could be 
further reinforced by the possibility that some tasks performed by service sectors are 
offshored to low-wage countries.
In the energy sector, a marked shift in the global distribution of trade is expected to 
occur over the next half century. The trade share of the United States in world energy 
exports is expected to more than triple by 2060, at the expense of the Middle East and the 
Russian Federation. These large expected gains are consistent with recent investments in 
technologies to extract and develop new sources of shale gas and oil, as compared with the 
exhaustion of conventional natural reserves in other parts of the world (e.g. IEA, 2012). 
Alongside the increase in energy trade, the United States maintains competitiveness in 
complementary industries such as chemicals (see Appendix A, Figure A.1). However, it 
should be noted that the energy sector is subject to large geopolitical and technological 
uncertainty over the next half century, making projections particularly vulnerable to 
unpredicted events.
In agriculture, the United States and other Asian countries are expected to remain 
competitive and their trade share in agricultural exports will increase mostly at the 
expense of Africa and Latin America. 
Figure 8.  The relative importance of different countries 
in specific industries is expected to change1
Countries shares in world exports (volume), 2010 and 2060
1. Manufacturing includes chemicals rubber and plastic, electronics, food, iron and steel, metal products, other 
manufacturing, other metals, other minerals, paper and wood, textiles, transport equipment. Service includes 
business service, transport service, wholesale and retail, public administration and other services. Agriculture 
includes livestock, rice and crops, other agriculture and other mining. Energy includes coal, crude oil, electricity, 
gas and refined oil.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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4.1.4. The industrial structure in emerging economies gradually becomes similar  
to that of the OECD
In parallel with the changing trade patterns, the industrial structure (measured as 
value-added shares of specific sectors in total value-added) will evolve differently across 
countries and regions depending on changing patterns of domestic and international 
demand, differences in the accumulation of production factors across countries, the 
allocation of factors across sectors within countries and countries’ international 
competitiveness. One general trend that stands out in the baseline projection is that most 
significant changes will occur in emerging economies, whereas the industrial structure 
will remain relatively stable in OECD countries over the next half century (Figure 9). This 
largely reflects the development process in lower-income countries with income and living 
standards catching-up towards levels of higher-income OECD countries, which results in 
changing domestic demand and consumption structure. Projections also show that trade 
costs remain large enough in certain industries to prevent a full shift of industrial activities 
to emerging economies away from OECD.
The industrial structure in fast-growing emerging countries will become more similar 
to the one in OECD economies. In emerging countries, past trends are expected to continue 
over the projection period and the industry mix will continue shifting towards services 
away from manufacturing, typically low-skilled (e.g. textile, food production, etc.). China 
and India are projected to experience marked increases in the contribution of financial and 
business services, wholesale and retail and transport services to value added as domestic 
demand for these services increases with income and shift in comparative advantage 
(Figure 9). This increased similarity among OECD and emerging countries implies that 
intra-industry trade should account for a larger share of trade over the next half century, 
contrasting with the recent decline associated with the large contribution of highly 
specialized emerging economies to world exports.
Despite the general reorientation towards services, manufacturing industries are still 
expected to remain important in emerging economies. For instance, in China, Indonesia 
and other Asian countries the contribution of the auto industry to value-added will 
increase over the next 50 years. Likewise, electronics is projected to account for an 
increasing share of GDP in China, reflecting strong competitiveness in this sector.
4.1.5. Income convergence will influence wage inequality among and within countries
Over the next 50 years income gaps among countries will narrow. Rapid GDP growth in 
emerging economies is matched by a tendency of GDP per capita to converge across 
countries. Between now and 2060, GDP per capita (measured in 2005 PPPs) in India, the 
Philippines and some African countries will increase by more than 7 times, while the 
increase is around five times in Indonesia and China (see Johansson and Olaberría 2014; 
OECD, 2014 for details). Over the same period, living standards will roughly double in the 
highest-income OECD countries. This will lead to a richer and more equal distribution of 
world income among countries, which will push in the direction of falling absolute poverty.
Furthermore, across countries the relative wage of skilled to unskilled labour will 
change over the next half century, with implications for trade patterns. The distribution of 
wages across differently skilled workers within countries depends on the supply and 
demand for skills, the extent of skill-biased technological change, the composition of 
consumption demand and institutional settings in labour markets and educational systems.
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Figure 9.  Industrial structure is set to change in emerging economies
Value-added shares of key industries by country, 2010 and 2060
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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The projected framework can only account for the influences of the relative supply of 
different skills and demand effects due to changing income levels and specialisation 
patterns, but not the effect of skill-biased technical change and institutional settings. Over 
the next half century educational attainment will continue to improve, increasing the 
supply of skilled labour. This leads to downward pressure on the skill premium in the 
model framework. However, as shown in Braconier et al. (2014) continued skill-biased 
technological progress, with rapidly rising demand for higher skills, is likely to outpace the 
increase in the supply of skills, leading to increased wage inequality over the next 50 years.
4.2. The speed of up-skilling in emerging economies influences GDP, trade  
and specialisation
The speed of up-skilling has important implications for trade and specialisation 
across countries. To highlight this, this section compares the baseline GDP and trade 
projection with one in which CII economies are assumed to approach the global frontier 
level of education much more slowly than in the baseline scenario as described in 
Section 3.2. Slower accumulation of human capital influences aggregate growth and by 
2060 results in a decrease in real GDP by 7% for China, 12% for India and 9% for Indonesia 
relative to baseline (Figure 10). This underlines the importance of skill accumulation for 
the development of these countries. There is also a more limited indirect impact in terms 
of GDP for other countries (less than 0.5%) channelled through capital markets, because 
lower GDP means less savings and investment.10
The reduction in aggregate growth due to slower accumulation of human capital in 
emerging economies affects trade across countries especially in CII economies (Figure 11). 
Indeed, world trade is some 2% lower by 2060 in the slower upskilling scenario as 
compared with the baseline, mainly driven by decreases in CII economies exports (ranging 
between 6-11%).
Slower upskilling in CII economies implies that the reorientation of trade and 
production towards higher value-added manufacturing and services away from lower-skill 
Figure 10.  Slower up-skilling reduces real GDP, 2005-601
Constant 2004 USD
1. Plain line: baseline scenario; dashed line: lower up-skilling scenario.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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activities occurs at a slower pace than in the baseline. For instance, in India and Indonesia 
by 2060 exports of business services and electronics would be 25% and 10% lower, 
respectively, whereas exports of agricultural goods (e.g. other agriculture, rice and crops, 
livestock) would be 5% and 15% higher, respectively, compared with the baseline (Figure 12). 
By contrast, slower upskilling in CII economies implies that advanced economies (e.g. the 
United States, Japan and the Euro area) maintain their relative competitiveness in products 
that are intensive in human capital, such as electronics, business services and other 
manufacturing.
Such a change in export specialisation is driven by developments in skilled and 
unskilled wages triggered by the slower upskilling in CII economies, which translate into 
variations in production prices. Slower upskilling in CII economies leads to a shortage of 
skilled workers relative to unskilled workers, which will increase the relative wage of 
skilled to unskilled labour as compared with the baseline. As shown in Figure 13, sector 
production price will vary according to skill intensity, with less skill-intensive sectors 
facing a decrease in their price and more skill-intensive ones an increase. Differences in 
the variation of production prices reflect cross-country differences in sectoral demand and 
factor endowments. In addition, changes in relative wages are not fully translated into 
changes in production prices due to substitution with other production factors. The 
induced change in production prices reshape a country’s competitiveness influencing 
trading partners’ demand for its goods (as well as for goods originating from all other 
countries).
4.3. Trade liberalisation can increase global trade and growth
This section gauges the impact of two stylised trade liberalisation scenarios on global 
trade, GDP, industrial structure and wage inequality over the next 50 years, compared with 
the baseline long-run scenario described above. As described in Section 3.3, one scenario 
considers strengthened regional integration among a set of current OECD economies 
Figure 11.  Effects on trade of lower upskilling in emerging economies, 2060
% change in volume of gross exports as compared with the baseline by 2060
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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(e.g. the United States, Canada, Mexico, the European Union, Switzerland, Australia, 
New Zealand, Japan and Korea), the other scenario considers trade liberalisation on a 
global basis.
4.3.1. Though gravity factors are key drivers of trade over the long-run,  
trade policies still matter
As previously highlighted in Fontagné and Fouré (2013) over the next decades changes 
in GDP will be the main driver of world trade, while changes in trade policies are unlikely 
to lead to changes of comparable magnitude (Figure 14). For instance, world goods exports 
are projected to increase on average by some 3.5% annually over the next 50 years due to 
changes in GDP, demography and other gravity factors, while regional trade and global 
Figure 12.  Slower upskilling in China, India and Indonesia slows down 
their restructuring towards higher skilled activities
% change in volume of industrial exports as compared with the baseline in 2060
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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multilateral liberalisation would add around 0.1 and 0.3 percentage points to annual OECD 
export growth, respectively. Thus, the projections suggest that OECD countries would not 
be able to keep their current position in world trade simply by moving towards deeper 
regional integration.
4.3.2. Unevenly distributed increases in trade from trade liberalisation
Projecting the alternative scenarios reveals mostly positive trade impacts across the 
globe but illustrates the different outcomes of regional versus multilateral approaches to 
trade liberalisation. World trade (exports) in the regional and partial multilateral 
liberalisation is 4% and 15% higher in 2060, respectively, but the gains are distributed 
unevenly across countries or regions in the two scenarios (Figure 15). While the effect of 
trade liberalisation in FTA members (mostly OECD economies) is to raise trade by around 
7-8% in both scenarios, non-FTA members (mostly non-OECD countries) only enjoy 
sizeable increases in trade in the multilateral scenario. For these economies the increase in 
Figure 13.  Production prices: Selected sectors, 2060
% deviation from baseline
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Figure 14.  Growth in GDP, exports of goods and services (volume), 2012-60
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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trade is only about 1% in the regional liberalisation scenario despite the bilateral 
agreements they conclude with members of the large FTA area (NAFTA, the European 
Union, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Korea). By contrast, multilateral liberalisation 
could raise their trade by 15% to 30%. An explanation for this is that non-tariff measures 
(transaction costs in goods and NTM in services) remain stable in the regional scenario, 
counteracting the reduction in tariffs. Nonetheless, as in the baseline, in both scenarios the 
bulk of all trade still occurs among non-OECD (non-FTA) countries or regions at the end of 
the projection period.
This asymmetry in the impact of liberalisation across OECD and non-OECD countries 
in the two scenarios can be explained by a reorientation of trade and by large trade 
diversion effects. In the regional liberalisation scenario, a share of potential trade will shift 
towards members of the FTA (OECD countries) away from non-members (non-OECD 
countries) (Figure 16). Part of this expansion of trade is replacing former trade of 
non-members with trade from regional members, as a result of the shift in relative market 
access conditions. As a result of this trade diversion some non-FTA countries will 
experience trade losses, particularly those in regions that do not sign a bilateral agreement 
with the FTA in 2030 (e.g. Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, etc.). By contrast, in the 
partial multilateral scenario trade is instead reoriented away from OECD countries towards 
the non-OECD area, reflecting comparatively larger reductions in tariffs than in OECD 
countries (i.e. given that initial tariff levels in the baseline are higher in non-OECD than in 
OECD), as well as stronger underlying growth performance in this area.
4.3.3. Trade liberalisation triggers moderate changes in trade specialisation  
and industrial structure
Trade liberalisation will increase international competition and induce a reallocation 
of resources across and within countries and industries. However, on the whole, the 
Figure 15.  Unevenly distributed increases in trade in liberalisation scenarios, 2060
% increase in gross exports as compared with the baseline by 2060, (volume), %
Source: Calculations based on MIRAGE.
%
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Full regional Partial multilateral
No
rth
 Af
ric
a
Ot
he
r A
fri
ca
Ot
he
r L
ati
n A
me
ric
a
Ind
ia
Br
az
il
Ca
sp
ian
Mi
dd
le 
Ea
st
Tu
rke
y
Ch
ina
So
uth
 Af
ric
a
Me
xic
o
Ru
ss
ian
 Fe
de
rat
ion
Ot
he
r A
sia
Ot
he
r E
uro
pe
Ko
rea
Ind
on
es
ia
Au
str
ali
a N
ew
 Ze
ala
nd
Ja
pa
n
Ch
ile
EF
TA
Eu
ro 
are
a
US
A
Ot
he
r A
SE
AN
Ot
he
r E
uro
pe
an
 U
nio
n
Ca
na
da
Un
ite
d K
ing
do
m
Wo
rld
TRADE PATTERNS IN THE 2060 WORLD ECONOMY 
OECD JOURNAL: ECONOMIC STUDIES – VOLUME 2015 © OECD 2015 25
change over time in the trade specialisation and, in turn, broad industrial structure 
triggered by deeper trade liberalisation in the two scenarios tends to be moderate 
compared with that which already occurs in the baseline. One explanation is that the 
implemented trade scenarios do not introduce any significantly differentiation in trade 
liberalisation among different sectors. Accordingly, countries’ trade specialisation pattern 
are not expected to change considerably as compared to the one observed in the baseline 
(Figure 17). Overall, this suggests that a larger share of the trade-induced reallocation of 
activities occurs within rather than between industries.
However, the change in trade specialisation in China that occurs in the multilateral 
scenario deserves a comment. Even though the education level in China will improve 
significantly over the next 50 years, multilateral trade liberalisation will slightly reinforce 
the Chinese specialisation in (low-skill intensive) textiles (from 11% to 12%) at the expense 
of (higher-skill intensive) electronics (34 to 32%). This is a consequence of the initial tariffs 
that China is facing in developed markets in these two sectors. The tariff on textiles is the 
highest tariff for manufactured goods that China is facing in Canada (15.3%) and the United 
States (11.5%) and the second highest in the Euro area (10.9%), with these three regions 
being significant destinations for Chinese textile products (the share of Canada, the United 
States and the Euro area in Chinese textile exports are, respectively, 2.5%, 23.5% and 23.6%). 
By contrast, Chinese electronic devices are facing initially the lowest tariff in the same 
three regions as well as being widely exported to them. As a result, halving these two tariffs 
implies a larger gain in revealed comparative advantage for textiles than for electronics, 
hence influencing the Chinese export specialisation.
Turning to the change in the industrial structure induced by trade liberalisation some 
interesting patterns emerge. In both alternative scenarios, the industrial structure in the 
United States tends to shift over time towards agriculture (rice and crops) and food 
production away from other manufacturing (Figure 18). This reallocation comes about 
through increased international competitiveness in the export market, reflecting increasing 
comparative advantage of the United States in this sector due to the combination of 
abundant arable land with the removal of high levels of agricultural support in some 
countries in the multilateral scenario. By contrast, the removal of agricultural support in the 
European Union (in the multilateral scenario) tends to reorient activities in the Euro area 
Figure 16.  Reorientation of trade towards FTA partners
Export shares in world trade based on bilateral gross exports, (volume), %
Source: Calculations based on MIRAGE.
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away from agriculture (rice and crops) towards manufacturing (e.g. the auto industry, 
transport services, textiles, food production). Similarly in Japan, in both scenarios, the 
activity moves away from agriculture and food production towards manufacturing, 
particularly transport equipment.
Among emerging economies, the change in industrial structure over the next half 
century is much more pronounced with partial multilateral liberalisation than with regional 
liberalisation, consistent with better market access and larger trade gains in the multilateral 
scenario. One common pattern is a shift towards manufacturing away from agriculture and 
food production. For instance, in India and Indonesia, by 2060 the value-added in the 
electronics sector would increase by more than 8% in the multilateral scenario, compared 
with baseline. Furthermore, multilateral liberalisation would increase the value-added of the 
Figure 17.  Export specialisation in manufactured products, 2060, volume, %
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 18.  Reallocation of industrial activities, 2060
% increase in value added of industries as compared with the baseline in 2060
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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auto industry by around 12% in India compared with baseline, reflecting a stronger impact of 
India’s competitiveness in labour-intensive low and medium-skilled manufacturing. 
Interestingly, even though China’s export specialisation in electronics is reduced in the 
multilateral scenario as compared with the baseline, the value added share of electronics in 
total value added increases by 2060. This likely reflects a higher domestic demand for 
electronics, whose production relies less on foreign intermediate inputs.
4.3.4. Trade liberalisation has a positive impact on real GDP, more so if liberalisation  
is multilateral
In parallel with the increased trade integration and associated reallocation of 
resources across sectors to comparatively more efficient ones, long-term real GDP will 
increase relative to baseline. World GDP in the regional and partial multilateral 
liberalisation scenarios is 0.6% and 2.8% higher in 2060, respectively. But again, the gains in 
long-term GDP are unevenly distributed across the globe in the two scenarios. While the 
change in real GDP in most OECD countries is similar in the two scenarios, the gains are 
always greater for non-FTA members (mostly non-OECD countries) in the multilateral 
scenario. Multilateral liberalisation could raise long-term real GDP in India and other Asian 
regions by more than 4% by 2060 (relative to baseline) (Figure 19).
The gains in terms of GDP illustrated here may appear modest compared with large 
changes observed as a result of growth fundamentals (e.g. demography, education, 
technical progress, etc.). However, it should be kept in mind that, while the MIRAGE-e 
projections capture only allocative gains, a better trade environment and level playing field 
are pre-conditions to reap the growth benefits of the mentioned fundamentals. Feedback 
effects of increased trade openness on growth in terms of acceleration of productivity 
catch-up (due to knowledge spillovers and diffusion of technologies) are not taken into 
Figure 19.  Trade liberalisation increases GDP, 2060
% increase in real GDP of trade liberalisation as compared with the baseline by 2060
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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account in the multilateral liberalisation scenario modelled with MIRAGe-e. A separate 
exercise conduced with the OECD model suggests that global GDP would gain an additional 
1.2% in 2060, due to these indirect growth effects of trade liberalisation.
4.3.5. Trade liberalisation tends to increase wage gaps between skilled  
and unskilled labour
Relative wages will be affected by trade liberalisation since the demand for different 
types of skills changes with specialization. Any excess demand or supply of skilled and 
unskilled labour would be absorbed in relative factor prices. Table 4 presents the change in 
the differential between growth in skilled and unskilled wages for the two trade 
liberalisation scenarios. A positive number means that skilled wages have increased faster 
than unskilled wages, thus within-country wage inequalities (the skill premium) increase. 
Overall, there is a tendency for the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers to 
widen in both advanced and emerging economies in the trade liberalisation scenarios 
relative to baseline. All categories of labour income (skilled and unskilled) increase in most 
developing and developed economies as a result of multilateral liberalisation, expanding 
relative demand for skilled-intensive goods and services worldwide. This shift in 
consumption patterns increases the relative demand for skills at the global level.
In most cases, upwards pressures on skill premia are stronger in the multilateral 
liberalisation scenario than in the regional one, reflecting greater reallocation of resources 
across industries and countries towards higher-skilled activities.11 Generally, however, 
these additive pressures originating from trade liberalisation are moderate. Stronger 
pressures on skill premia are observed in European countries and Japan, as demand shifts 
from low-skilled sectors towards higher-skilled ones, as well in some other advanced 
economies (e.g. the United Kingdom and EFTA countries). Pressures on wages of skilled 
Table 4.  Skilled and unskilled wage gaps1
Percentage point change in the relative wage of skilled to unskilled as compared with baseline
Region
2030 2060
Multilateral Regional Multilateral Regional
Euro area 0.20 0.10 0.79 0.41
United Kingdom 0.23 0.12 0.98 0.48
Other European Union 0.24 0.11 0.93 0.45
United States 0.07 0.01 0.24 0.03
Japan 0.14 0.15 0.55 0.63
Brazil 0.02 0.022 0.21 -0.00
Russian Federation -0.55 0.04 -3.56 0.25
India 0.15 0.022 0.75 0.10
China 0.22 -0.092 0.46 -0.03
South Africa 0.40 0.03 1.74 0.01
Chile -0.16 0.022 -0.64 0.02
Indonesia 0.32 0.002 1.62 0.17
Other ASEAN 0.26 0.062 0.89 0.002
Turkey 0.11 0.05 0.26 0.26
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.39 0.03 5.20 -0.042
1. A positive number means that wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labour has risen, that is skilled wage 
increases more that unskilled wage or unskilled wage decreases more that skilled wage.
2. Both skilled and unskilled wages are decreasing.
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workers are also significant in some developing economies such as Indonesia, India or 
South Africa due to the strong reorientation of production towards the relatively 
high-skilled electronic sector in combination with comparatively lower up-skilling than in 
some other emerging economies (e.g. China). Finally, a few developing economies display a 
decrease in both skilled and unskilled wages before signing bilateral agreements with FTA 
members in the regional liberalisation scenario (i.e. note 2 in Table 4). This is caused by the 
trade deviation associated with the implementation of the FTA.
5. Conclusion
This paper draws global trade and specialisation scenarios up to 2060, taking into 
account international spillovers. Scenarios of trade and specialisation over the next 
50 years are based on a framework that combines long-term macro projections for the 
world economy with a detailed sectoral general equilibrium model (Mirage-e). The 
combination of aggregate growth projections with the more detailed description of the 
behaviour of consumers and firms provided by the Mirage-e model allows highlighting how 
countries’ specialisation is shaped by global trends (e.g. ageing, skill enhancement, capital 
investment, technology diffusion, etc.). It also highlights how structural and macro policies 
implemented in each country will affect future trade and specialisation patterns, taking 
into account inter-linkages across countries.
The results of the exercise provide five main insights that can be useful to understand 
potential future developments of the world economy. First, the geographical centre of trade 
will continue to shift towards emerging economies. Fast GDP growth in China, India and 
other Asian countries is associated with gains in trade shares over the next half century. 
Thus, the share of global trade within the present OECD will decline from 50% in 2012 to 
25% by 2060, while trade among non-OECD economies will account for approximately one-
third of global trade.
Second, China, India and other Asian economies will continue to strengthen their role 
in manufacturing trade. For instance, by 2060 China and other Asian economies will 
account for the bulk of world exports in electronics. Significant shifts will also occur in 
services, with China and other emerging economies gaining large trade shares at the 
expense of the Euro area, the United Kingdom and the United States.
Third, in parallel with shifts in trade patterns the industrial structure in emerging 
economies will gradually become similar to that of the present OECD, whereas it remains 
fairly unchanged in OECD economies. In emerging economies, past trends are expected to 
continue over the next 50 years and the industry mix will continue shifting towards 
services away from manufacturing, typically low-skilled (e.g. textile, food production, etc.), 
driven by income gains and changing consumption patterns.
Fourth, trade liberalisation will contribute to higher growth. In particular, gradually 
removing tariffs, regulatory barriers in services and agricultural support, as well as 
reducing transaction costs on goods (e.g. costs of handling at customs) could increase 
global trade and GDP over the next 50 years. Specific scenarios of regional or partial 
multilateral liberalisation among a core group of OECD countries could, respectively, raise 
trade by 4% and 15% and GDP by 0.6% and 2.8% by 2060 relative to the status quo. However, 
the gains would be distributed unevenly across countries. Regional liberalisation would 
bring greater gains to members of the free-trade agreement, notably OECD countries, 
rather than to non-members, due to trade diversion.
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Finally, investment in education is crucial for trade and high-skill specialisation 
patterns over the coming decades. In fact, slower educational upgrading in key emerging 
economies (i.e. China, India and Indonesia) than expected in the baseline scenario could 
reduce world exports by 2% by 2060, with decreases ranging between 6-11% in China, India 
and Indonesia. Lower up-skilling in emerging economies would also slowdown the 
restructuring towards higher value-added activities in these emerging economies.
Notes 
1. The main results presented in this study would most likely be similar to the ones obtained if the 
macro economic projections for all countries were based on Fouré et al. (2013). This is because the 
projection methodologies for potential GDP are very similar in the two projections, including the 
assumptions on convergence parameters. The main difference would appear in the short and 
medium run, given that the OECD methodology assumes convergence of effective to potential output.
2. The long-run growth projections depend on various assumptions such as the speed of convergence 
to the long-run steady state. In this study the assumptions on key parameters shaping drivers of 
growth are informed by past trends and econometric estimates.
3. There are a number of countries where capital intensity has shown a definite recent trend and, 
where this is the case, the trend is assumed to gradually disappear so that the underlying capital-
output ratio stabilises.
4. At early stages of development, economies rely largely on agricultural production, which is not 
very energy-intensive, while industrialisation leads to an intensification of energy use and the 
later change towards services reverses the trend. Conditioning the energy-efficiency catch-up to 
the level of development allows representing this stylised fact at the macro level.
5. The technical frontier in MaGE is not affected by this redefinition (see Section 2.2).
6. Accordingly, unemployment is only captured via its short-term impact on GDP of the 42 countries 
covered by OECD long-term projections, which is then reported in the endogenous TFP of MIRAGE-e.
7. In MIRAGE-e, contrary to MaGE, no gender distinction is made.
8. The information on FTAs was downloaded from: http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicAllRTAList.aspx at the 
end of 2012.
9. The detailed implementation is available from the authors upon request.
10. In the OECD model, this adjustment takes place through the price of capital, while in MaGE 
investment in the 105 countries is rescaled to match world savings.
11. It should be kept in mind that the model does not account for any feedback from skill premia to 
investment in education and the supply of skills, which could have implications for wage gaps. 
Also, any existence of shared rents between employers and employees in protected sectors prior to 
the trade liberalisation is not taken into account.
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APPENDIX A
Additional data
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Figure A.1.  Trade shares in selected industries, 2010 and 2060
% of world exports
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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